Singapore International Commercial Court Dismisses Russian Federation’s Immunity Claim in Enforcement Proceedings

The recent decision by the Singapore International Commercial Court ("SICC") in Hulley Enterprises Ltd v The Russian Federation [2025] SGHC(I) 19 buys certainty on matters related to enforceability of arbitral awards, even against state parties. The SICC dismissed the Russian Federation’s application to set aside an order granting the former majority shareholders of OAO Yukos Oil Company (the “Claimants”) leave to enforce three arbitral awards totalling over US$63 billion. 

The Russian Federation argued it was immune from the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts under the State Immunity Act 1979 (the "SIA") and that the arbitration exception under Section 11(1) of the SIA did not apply.

The SICC ruled that the Russian Federation was precluded from re-litigating this issue due to transnational issue estoppel arising from decisions of the Dutch appellate seat courts, which had conclusively determined the same jurisdictional objections. The SICC held that the requirements for issue estoppel were satisfied, as the Dutch courts’ judgments were final, conclusive, and on the merits. [1]

Application of Transnational Issue Estoppel

The SICC relied on the Singapore Court of Appeal’s binding decision in Deutsche Telekom AG v Republic of India [2024] 1 SLR 56 (“Deutsche Telekom (CA)”), which confirmed that transnational issue estoppel applies in international arbitration. The court recognised that “[t]he doctrine of transnational issue estoppel can and should be applied by a Singapore enforcement court when determining whether preclusive effect should be accorded to a seat court's decision going towards the validity of an arbitral award”. [2]

The Russian Federation argued that applying issue estoppel would prevent a de novo review of its immunity claim and impermissibly enlarge the court’s jurisdiction. [3] The SICC rejected this for the following reasons. 

(a) The Russian Federation had not cited any authorities to support its position that the question of whether section 11(1) of the SIA was engaged should be determined by a de novo review by the enforcement court "without reference to the principle of transnational issue estoppel as part of its residual domestic law". [4]

(b) The court has implied jurisdiction to decide on its own jurisdiction, and in the event its decision is overturned on appeal, "there would not have been any enlargement of conferral of jurisdiction which was not otherwise conferred, but rather an error in determining the question of jurisdiction, and its subsequent correction." [5]

Sovereign Immunity and International Law

The court emphasised that the SIA governs state immunity under Singapore law, including its exceptions, and rejected the argument that applying issue estoppel undermines Singapore’s international law obligations. It noted that the SIA reflects the “restrictive doctrine” of sovereign immunity, which excludes immunity for private law transactions such as arbitration agreements. [6]

Conclusion

The majority of the SICC concluded that the Russian Federation did not have immunity under the SIA and is precluded from re-litigating its jurisdictional objections. [7] This judgment reinforces Singapore’s commitment to upholding the finality of arbitral awards and the principle of issue estoppel in cross-border disputes. 

[1] See [112] to [113] of Hulley Enterprises Ltd v The Russian Federation [2025] SGHC(I) 19.

[2] See [72] of Hulley Enterprises Ltd v The Russian Federation [2025] SGHC(I) 19, citing Deutsche Telekom (CA) at [96].

[3] See [57] and [58] of Hulley Enterprises Ltd v The Russian Federation [2025] SGHC(I) 19.

[4] See [124] of Hulley Enterprises Ltd v The Russian Federation [2025] SGHC(I) 19.

[5] See [130] of Hulley Enterprises Ltd v The Russian Federation [2025] SGHC(I) 19.

[6] See [143] to [144] of Hulley Enterprises Ltd v The Russian Federation [2025] SGHC(I) 19.

[7] See [146] of Hulley Enterprises Ltd v The Russian Federation [2025] SGHC(I) 19.

The EU Takes a Stand: Why Brussels Is Challenging a Renewable Energy Arbitration Award 

While Spain continues to face multiple arbitration proceedings over its reform of renewable energy incentive schemes, the European Commission has concluded its first investigation on the matter — and has firmly backed Spain’s position. 

The dispute dates back to the 2018 ICSID award in Antin v. Kingdom of Spain (Case No. ARB/13/31). The claimant had invested —through its Luxembourg and Netherlands based affiliates— in two solar thermal plants in southern Spain under the 2007 regulatory framework which provided investment incentives for renewable energy projects. Due to the elimination of the scheme in 2013, the tribunal found that Spain had violated the Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”) by failing to provide fair and equitable treatment to Antin’s investment, and ultimately awarded €101 million, plus interest and legal costs.

Since the start of disputes over Spain’s renewables reform, the European Commission has consistently maintained that the ECT does not apply between EU Member States — as in Antin’s case. And even if it did, investor-State arbitration within the EU would still violate the EU Treaties. This position was confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) in its 2018 Achmea judgment (Case C-284/16) which held that arbitration clauses in intra-EU bilateral investment treaties are incompatible with EU law, as they undermine the autonomy and primacy of the EU legal order. The Commission holds that the same reasoning applies to multilateral agreements like the ECT and therefore national courts must refuse to enforce any award rendered on that basis. 

Despite this, courts in several third countries— including Australia, the UK, and the US— have ruled in favour of enforcement of such arbitral awards. Meanwhile, Spain’s attempts to challenge those decisions remain ongoing in different jurisdictions.

In this context, the European Commission has thrown its weight behind Spain. In its decision (State aid SA. 54155 (2021/NN)), it confirmed that the Antin award constitutes State aid because it has the effect of compensating for the withdrawal of unlawful aid — namely, the 2007 scheme. Since the award benefits a single company, is imputable to the Spanish State, and poses a risk of distorting competition and trade within the internal market, the Commission considers it incompatible with EU law.

Importantly, the Commission’s position is not a mere recommendation. By qualifying the award as unlawful State aid, it imposes an obligation on Spain to refrain from executing the payment. It also reminds national courts of their duty to cooperate with EU institutions to prevent the recognition or enforcement of the arbitral award in any jurisdiction. 

Some courts in EU Member States appear to be siding with Spain. A court in Amsterdam recently warned AES Solar Energy and Ampere Equity — two Dutch companies awarded €26.5 million in arbitration, with the rights now held by U.S. fund Blasket Renewable — that they could be held liable to compensate Spain if the European Commission were to classify the payment as unlawful State aid.

While the CJEU has yet to deliver its final word, the message from Brussels is clear: intra-EU investment arbitration awards relating to the renewables 2007 scheme not only lack legal basis under EU law, but their execution may also violate State aid rules. As a result, the road to enforcement is becoming increasingly narrow for European investors. In this shifting legal landscape, some say uncertainty benefits the boldest.

Constituting Tribunals in Investment Arbitration

The process of appointing arbitrators is a cornerstone of any arbitration. This is particularly true in investment treaty arbitration, where disputes often involve public, high stakes, and complex legal issues. A recent report by the IBA Investment Arbitration Subcommittee, titled “Constituting Tribunals in Investment Arbitration: A Report on Timing and Methods” – to which our Paris-based partner Ioana Knoll-Tudor contributed as a member of the Subcommittee – sheds light on the timeframes and methods for constituting arbitral tribunals in investment arbitration.

The Challenge Of Appointing Presiding Arbitrators

While sole arbitrator appointments are rare in investment arbitration, the appointment of presiding arbitrators in three-member tribunals is often the most complex and time-consuming phase. The average time to constitute a tribunal varies greatly across arbitral institutions: when the arbitral institution supervises or directly appoints the president, ICSID takes an average of 237 days (from registration of the request for arbitration to the appointment of the president), the PCA 202 days, and the SCC (as the most efficient) at just 91 days.

Institution-specific Insights

Selecting efficient appointment procedures is thus key in order for parties to minimise costs and delays, particularly given the complexity of investment disputes. To this end, some institutions offer unique procedures. The ICC Court, for instance, can directly appoint presiding arbitrators where a state or state entity is involved. Although this allows for expedited appointments, practitioners must make sure to provide the ICC Secretariat with clear guidance on arbitrator profiles. The PCA also frequently uses the UNCITRAL List-Procedure (Article 8(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules), where parties strike and rank candidates from a list provided by the appointing authority. To avoid delays, the PCA often proposes a modified list-procedure, limiting the number of strikes to ensure at least one candidate remains.

Practical Takeaways

Based on the data, the most common methods of appointment can be ranked as follows, from quickest to slowest: 1. direct appointments by institutions, 2. joint appointments by co-arbitrators, 3. strike-and-rank procedures, 4. ballot procedure (whereby the parties separately indicate their (dis)agreement with proposed candidates, and the institution appointing an agreed candidate if one exists), and 5. bespoke party-agreed methods (which tend to be the slowest due to their complexity).

As much as possible, parties should thus aim to avoid overly complex or multi-layered methods of appointment, which can lead to delays or defaults. For example, limiting the number of candidates in a list-procedure and ensuring clear instructions to institutions can significantly expedite the process.

Alternate Methods for Appointing Presiding Arbitrators

Against this background, the IBA Report identifies four alternate methods to enhance efficiency:

• Co-arbitrator involvement: Co-arbitrators propose a shortlist of candidates, followed by a strike-and-rank process (thus reducing delays while maintaining party input),
• Institutional involvement: Institutions propose candidates, conduct availability checks, and facilitate a strike-and-rank process,
• ICSID template: Based on the ICSID Expedited Arbitration Rules, which provide a structured timeline for appointments, including a list-procedure for the presiding arbitrator, and
• PCA modified list-procedure: This approach limits the number of strikes to ensure at least one candidate remains.

Conclusion

It is essential that parties prioritise simplicity and clarity in appointing presiding arbitrators. Opt for streamlined methods like direct institutional appointments or co-arbitrator-led strike-and-rank processes. Avoid overly complex, multi-step procedures that risk delays. Providing clear instructions and limiting candidate lists can further expedite tribunal constitution, ensuring that your arbitration procedures remain more efficient and cost-effective.

Key Contacts: Dr. Ioana Knoll-Tudor, Aymar Claret de Fleurieu

Jurisdictional Battles: Arbitration in the Shadow of Sanctions - Dr Cezary Wiśniewski,Partner at Addleshaw Goddard Poland*

*Cezary acted as counsel for PESA Bydgoszcz in the landmark dispute between PESA and Uraltransmash

Sanctions have increasingly become a powerful tool of geopolitical strategy. However, their effects extend beyond diplomacy and trade, significantly influencing international commercial and investment arbitration. In recent years, sanctioned States have developed legal frameworks aimed at shielding their nationals from foreign arbitration, challenging the primacy of arbitration agreements. Russia's 2020 amendments to its Arbitrazh Procedure Code—commonly known as the Lugovoy Law—are a key example of this trend.

The Lugovoy Law grants Russian commercial courts exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving sanctioned Russian entities even if there is an existing arbitration agreement or jurisdiction clause. The law has emboldened Russian entities to bypass international arbitration mechanisms and instead rely on domestic legal remedies.

One of the earliest cases under the Lugovoy Law was Uraltransmash v. PESA. In 2013, Polish company PESA entered into a tram supply contract with UralTransMash (UTM), a Russian company majority-owned by UralVagonZavod. After UTM defaulted on payments, PESA initiated arbitration proceedings in 2018 at the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), in line with the arbitration clause.

UTM, citing the new Lugovoy Law, responded by filing civil claims in Russian courts. In July 2020, it sought an anti-suit injunction against PESA to halt the SCC arbitration and demanded EUR 56 million in penalties if PESA failed to comply.

In December 2021, the Russian Supreme Court issued a landmark decision. It held that the mere imposition of foreign sanctions was enough to consider an arbitration agreement involving a sanctioned entity as potentially invalid. The rationale was that sanctions could create a perception that the sanctioned party might not receive equal or impartial treatment in arbitration proceedings seated in sanctioning countries.

Despite this broad interpretation, the Russian courts ultimately rejected UTM’s request. The Arbitrazh Court noted that UTM had fully participated in the arbitration, appointed arbitrators, and had competent legal and expert representation. It also found that the EU’s sectoral sanctions against UTM did not sufficiently impede its access to justice, particularly since UTM was not subject to the more severe sanctions involving asset freezes or travel bans. US sanctions were deemed irrelevant in this context. The Russian Supreme Court concurred, leading to the dismissal of the anti-suit injunction.

Since the 2022 escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Lugovoy Law has been used more aggressively. In a high-profile case, Russia invoked the law to stop German energy company Wintershall Dea from pursuing a EUR 7.5 billion Energy Charter Treaty claim. Russian courts were asked to impose equivalent penalties on the company, its lawyers, and even the arbitrators, holding them jointly and severally liable if they continued with the arbitration.

The Lugovoy Law has recently faced constitutional scrutiny. On 29 April, the Constitutional Court of Russia rejected a challenge by German bank OWH, affirming the law's constitutionality. However, the Court clarified that Russian courts must assess each case individually and cannot assume the invalidity of arbitration agreements solely due to sanctions.

As global sanctions regimes expand, the Lugovoy Law exemplifies how domestic legal tools are being used to counteract their effects—potentially reshaping the enforcement and reliability of international arbitration.

Key Contact: Dr Cezary Wiśniewski

Federal Court of Justice, I ZB 48/24, 9 January 2025

Can an invalid procedural arrangement render an entire arbitration agreement ineffective?

The Federal Court of Justice (BGH) recently addressed whether a potentially invalid procedural arrangement within a contract affects the validity of the arbitration clause—and thus the arbitration agreement itself. The ruling clarifies the relationship between such procedural arrangements and arbitration clauses under the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO), emphasizing German jurisprudence on general terms and conditions (AGB) law.

The parties of the dispute concluded a construction contract for the construction of a solar power plant. The contract’s arbitration clause (clause 28.3) reads as follows: 

“(i) All disputes arising out of or in connection with this contract or its validity shall be finally settled in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the German Institution of Arbitration (DIS), excluding recourse to ordinary courts of law.” 

One of the directly following provisions of clause 28.3 effectively declares the entire German law regarding terms and conditions inapplicable:

“(v) The applicable law in this matter is governed by clause 28.1. The parties expressly agree to waive the application of Sections 305 to 310 of the German Civil Code (BGB).” (the procedural arrangement in question)

Another contractual regulation allowed contractual penalties of an amount of up to 10% of the contract’s net volume.

In July 2022 the applicant filed an arbitral claim under the rules set out in the contract for contractual payments (more than EUR 3.2 m). The respondent, in their counterclaim, sought damages, including contractual penalties (EUR 1.35 m).

With no arbitrator appointed, the parties unsuccessfully attempted to resolve their dispute by mediation. Following the mediation the applicant filed a motion pursuant to Sec. 1032(2) ZPO, claiming that the invalidity of the procedural agreement between the parties would also lead to the invalidity of the arbitration clause, and hence the arbitral tribunal would lack jurisdiction. 

At the legal core of the dispute are two questions:

 (1) Is the regulation regarding the contractual penalties contrary to German law on standard terms (Sec. 305–310 BGB) and, thus, does it lead to the invalidity of the procedural arrangement?

(2) Does the potential invalidity of the procedural arrangement lead to the invalidity of the arbitration clause?

The Court of Appeal in Berlin found the applicant’s motion that the contractual penalty clause was contrary to German law admissible but unfounded. It is not contrary to the German law principle of good faith (Treu und Glauben, see Sec. 242 BGB) for the applicant to initiate the arbitral proceeding and then subsequently, 15 months later, file a motion challenging the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal in said proceedings. First, the arbitration clause itself was concluded validly. Second, the question concerning the validity of the contractual penalties was not to be decided because it was not part of the actual arbitration clause. Furthermore, the questions of validity of procedural arrangements and the valid choice of law are subject to the decision of the arbitral tribunal – as the parties decided in their arbitration clause. The validity of the arbitration clause would also not be challenged, even if the procedural arrangement in question would be deemed invalid. Nothing else can be derived from the former jurisprudence of the Federal Court of Justice because the cases are not comparable.

Upon appeal by the applicant, the Federal Court of Justice upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals. The conduct of the applicant was within good faith. German law is applicable to the arbitration clause and it was concluded validly. Even though there was unconditional admission to the main proceedings (rügeloses Einlassen zur Hauptsache), the applicant did not waive its right to file the motion under Sec. 1032(2) ZPO. However, the possible invalidity of the procedural arrangement – the exclusion of the application of the German law on standard terms and conditions – has no influence on the validity of the arbitration clause. First, the arrangement would stand up to scrutiny under the appropriate test (AGB-Kontrolle). Second, even if the individual arrangement would be invalid, the rest of the contract would be valid. This is further underlined by the parties’ intent: they included a severability clause in the contract. Third, due to the inclusion of DIS arbitration rules, the arbitrator’s adequate legal knowledge is assured. This was not given in the older case law of the Federal Court of Justice. The ruling concludes by highlighting that the while the parties are free to elect not to apply the German law on standard terms and conditions, any arbitral award is subject to review on ordre public grounds in the annulment or enforcement proceedings.

Takeaway?

With this ruling, the Federal Court of Justice strengthens the contractual freedoms of parties as well as the role of arbitration as a tool of dispute resolution. The court clarified its restrictive role in contract interpretation in cases in which the parties validly agreed on arbitration. It is noteworthy that the exclusion of binding German regulations while choosing German law in itself does not suffice to also render an arbitration clause invalid. The exclusion of German law on standard terms and conditions itself does also not infringe German ordre public, however, the resulting arbitral award may. This question – for now – has to be considered and answered by the sole arbitrator and by the courts in subsequent enforcement or annulment proceedings but in any event will be determined by looking at the results in each individual case.

Dispute Adjudication Boards: an Effective Tool for Dispute Resolution?

Dispute Adjudication Boards (“DABs”) have been a standard feature in the FIDIC suite of contracts since 1999. However, they do not commonly appear in bespoke contracts.

There is often a preconception that DABs can be just as costly and prolonged as arbitrations.  However, when the parties approach the DAB process at the right time and in the right way, not only can DABs help to keep the project progressing, but they can often avoid the need for an arbitration altogether.

How can the DAB process be used effectively? 

Timing of the referral(s)

A key benefit of DABs lies in their ability to address disputes soon after they arise, and during the course of the project.

Where disputes are not referred to any form of dispute resolution until after completion, positions frequently become entrenched and the size and complexity of the disputes increase substantially.  This makes a referral to a DAB far less likely to resolve the disputes, as the DAB process is then seen as merely a mandatory step on the inevitable road to arbitration.  Instead, consideration may be given to referring disputes to a DAB when they are crystallised during the course of the project.  

By intervening as and when a dispute arises, a DAB can provide decisions or recommendations that allow the parties to move the project forward. This proactive approach may minimise the risk of project delays and cost overruns, as well as help to maintain a working relationship between the parties, fostering a collaborative working environment. 

Bite-sized issue(s)

The DAB process is most effective when discrete issues are referred. This helps to stop a DAB becoming, in effect, a ‘mini arbitration’. Breaking down a large dispute into smaller issues can also unlock progress on the wider dispute by addressing critical points of contention. 

For example, if there is a large and complex extension of time claim, consider whether there are fundamental issues, or points of principle, that underpin disputes regarding entitlement to extensions of time such as a decision that a particular instruction constitutes a variation, or that one party failed to comply with its obligation to obtain specific permits. This can then make other, more peripheral issues, far more likely to be resolved by agreement. 

This staged approach can be instrumental in maintaining project momentum, by obtaining prompt decisions that will assist the parties to progress and to aid in resolving the wider dispute or future disputes.

Minimal rounds of submissions

To get the full benefit of a DAB process (which is intended to provide decisions within a relatively short time period), it is often important to limit the exchange of submissions to only those that are strictly necessary. Where there are multiple rounds of arguments, rebuttals, and counter-rebuttals, this risks transforming the DAB process into a drawn-out and costly process that can largely defeat its intended purpose.

In addition to limiting submissions, the use of witness statements and expert evidence should also be managed carefully. Witness evidence should be used only where it is strictly necessary, rather than as a default feature of the process. Similarly, if only a discrete issue has been referred to the DAB, expert evidence may not be required at all. Where expert input is necessary, it should be focused on the specific point on which expert evidence will assist the DAB, and ought to be kept proportionate to the issues. Over-reliance on lengthy expert reports risks complicating the process unnecessarily, increasing costs and impacting on the DAB’s ability to deliver the timely and practical decisions that are necessary for DABs to have their maximum benefit.

Key Contact: Gabriella Allin

The Use of AI by Arbitrators: Exploring the Opportunities and Managing the Risks

The Uses of AI by Arbitrators

AI tools are potentially well-suited to the workload of a tribunal.  

There are a multitude of tasks that an arbitrator is required to perform that might benefit from AI support.  This includes (i) performing administrative tasks, (ii) sorting, categorising or summarising large amounts of evidence and/or pleadings, and (iii) drafting procedural or other documents. 

The use of AI by arbitrators nevertheless requires caution: while it can assist arbitrators in performing their functions, it must be used with care to avoid undermining the foundational principles that underlie the arbitral process.

The Challenges

A particular challenge arises in the use of AI in tribunal decision-making. Tribunals may use AI tools to draft parts of awards, offer recommendations for outcomes, or review the primary materials.  In doing so, the deliberative process can be inhibited and decision making can be delegated.  In P v Q, an English High Court case dealing with the analogous issue of the delegation of responsibilities to tribunal secretaries, the judge referred to the “non-delegable and personal decision-making function” of a tribunal.

Other concerns include (i) issues over confidentiality when data is uploaded to an AI platform (e.g. ChatGPT), (ii) problems with errors or unexplainable outcomes deriving from the algorithmic nature of AI, and (iii) the risk of the adoption of underlying biases if AI is relied on without critical analysis. 

Managing the Issue

There are three ways that the use of AI by arbitrators may be managed to prevent the arbitral process from being undermined. We consider the early engagement of the parties/tribunal on this topic to be advisable.

First, the tribunal may itself impose AI protocols or procedural directions on proceedings, such as restrictions on the tools that will be used or directions on the disclosure that will be given. Tribunals have broad powers to manage arbitration procedure, which should include the use of technology.

Second, the tribunal/parties may consider adopting one of the small numbers of guidelines that have appeared over the past 15 months in relation to the use of AI by arbitrators (and parties). These guidelines – which include the SVAMC Guidelines and the CIArb Guidelines – generally require that arbitrators are transparent with parties about their use of AI and do not delegate their decision-making powers.

Third, institutions, and fourth, governments, may lay down binding requirements. One example is the EU AI Act, soon to come into effect, which contains requirements that will apply to certain activities by arbitrators in the EU.

The Risks Presented

Managing the use of AI by arbitrators is critical to ensuring transparency and maintaining foundational principles of arbitration such as party consent, procedural fairness and arbitrator independence. However, with greater transparency comes an increased risk of legitimate – and illegitimate – due process challenges by parties.

We expect to see an increase in applications to remove arbitrators, set aside awards, and challenge the enforcement of awards on the grounds of the use of AI. No such challenges have been made in England & Wales to date, although there has been a reported challenge to an award based on the use of AI in the US (LaPaglia v Valve Corporation).  

The tribunal holds a unique role in the arbitral process. This role requires that the desire for efficiency should not undermine the quality and integrity of the proceedings. Like all things in arbitration procedures, it is about striking a balance. 

As the use of AI becomes more widespread, this is a topic that will become of increasing concern to users, all parties to the arbitration should engage with their tribunals on this topic from the outset to avoid problems down the line.

Key Contacts: Rick Gal, Cameron Kang

Arbitration act 2025 - Highly Anticipated Reforms Take Effect

On 1 August 2025, the substantive provisions of the Arbitration Act 2025 (AA25) came into force. This has triggered limited, but welcome, reform to the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA96). Now that the long-awaited reforms have taken effect, it is prudent for the users of arbitration to be familiar with the key changes, which are summarised below.

1) Applicable Law to the Arbitration Agreement

AA25 provides that, where not expressly agreed otherwise, the law of the seat of the arbitration will govern the law of the arbitration agreement. The law applicable to the arbitration agreement deals with issues such as whether there is a valid and binding agreement to arbitrate and the scope of that agreement. This improves certainty and predictability for parties, replacing (and reversing) the more complex position in Enka v Chubb. Where a party prefers for a particular law to govern the arbitration agreement, it is obliged to say so expressly.

2) The Arbitral Tribunal

AA25 codifies arbitrators' general duty of disclosure, as established in Halliburton v Chubb. This requires arbitrators to disclose circumstances that might reasonably give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality, before or after commencement of the arbitration. The result could be greater numbers of disclosures from arbitrators and, potentially, more arbitrator challenges.

AA25 will also strengthen arbitrator immunity in instances where (1) an arbitrator is removed by the court and intervenes in those proceedings in good faith or (2) an arbitrator resigns for reasons that are reasonable. The strengthening of immunity should further empower arbitrators to act robustly.

3) Jurisdictional Challenges

AA25 makes provision for new rules of court that will reduce the scope of jurisdictional (section 67) challenges to awards before the English court. The new regime proposes limits on the hearing of new or existing evidence de novo by the court. Further, arguments that were not put before the tribunal will not generally be able to be raised with the court. Sensibly, the changes are subject to an "otherwise in the interests of justice" proviso.

4) Arbitral Proceedings and Court Powers

AA25 expressly recognises the power of tribunal to make an award on a summary basis in relation to a claim/defence that lacks a `real prospect of success'. The clarity that a tribunal can dismiss frivolous claims summarily should aid in reducing costs and increasing the speed of arbitration.

AA25 also confirms that the court is able to make orders in support of an arbitration (such as in respect of assets) against third parties and provides support for the emergency arbitrator regime.

Conclusion

The reforms of AA25 are designed to reinforce London's status as a leading international arbitration seat. While the reforms are modest in number and nature, they provide important fixes and clarifications to a number of important areas of English arbitration law. 

Key Contacts: Nathalie Allen, Rick Gal and Agustin Spotorno