Recoverable property can be traced into the hands of innocent third parties
Under Part 5 of POCA, recoverable property can be traced into the hands of anyone who later obtains it, including into accounts held by financial institutions. Section 308 provides limited protection where the recipient obtained the property in good faith, for value and without notice that it was recoverable. Once the recipient has notice, that protection falls away, however legitimate the underlying commercial relationship.
A recent first-instance decision involving a well-known member-owned cooperative in the sports sector illustrates how strictly that element may be applied. The company had received significant payments under a licensing arrangement from a contracting party whose funds were later made subject to an NCA freezing order.
The relevant payments were received after the company had been put on notice that its contracting party had been formally charged by the Gambling Commission with offences under the Gambling Act 2005. The licensing agreement and the consideration for the transfers had been established several years earlier. The account holder did not need to have done anything wrong for its accounts to be frozen by court order.
The resulting friction is self-evident: a legitimate corporate customer may lose access to working capital for months through no fault of its own. The decision also shows that prudent ring-fencing and a DAML may reduce AML risk while, at the same time, increasing asset recovery risk, because a documented suspicion may become part of the evidential basis for an account freezing order.
Asset recovery is often intelligence-led and difficult to predict
In another case, Sweeting J granted HMRC a without-notice property freezing order under section 245A of POCA over three properties and an HBOS savings account said to be connected to an unregistered money service business. The court identified a substantial discrepancy between declared income and actual financial activity.
HMRC’s analysis combined PAYE and self-assessment records with banking data from 14 accounts, obtained through tax tribunal orders and a POCA disclosure order. No single bank held the complete picture. Some transaction patterns were visible within individual banks, and AML controls appeared to have worked as designed because the respondents shifted from cash to transfers after controls tightened in 2018.The activity emerged only from HMRC’s combined view of tax records, company filings and multiple banks.
Again, it is self-evident that a bank cannot not necessarily see transactions in accounts held elsewhere, nor know what its customer has declared to HMRC. Greater intelligence sharing therefore creates the prospect of more disclosure and freezing orders involving customers whom a bank has no legal basis to exit or report.
The risk here is not necessarily liability for money laundering but is operational, reputational and conduct risk, that crystallises at the point of intervention. Institutions must be ready to respond to asset freezes or contact from authorities under time pressure, manage customers without tipping them off and subsequently demonstrate that controls and monitoring were effective, even where only the wider intelligence picture supported the intervention.
Political pressure can increase the likelihood of intervention
The key authority of R (World Uyghur Congress) v National Crime Agency [2024] EWCA Civ 715 involved a case where the court needed to consider whether POCA could support UK proceedings concerning arm’s-length transactions involving imports allegedly produced using forced labour that would be brought with the aim of discouraging UK companies from dealing with suppliers using those practices.
In the course of legal arguments, it became clear that the NCA considered that payment of adequate consideration somewhere in the supply chain would “cleanse” goods known or suspected to have been produced using forced labour. The Court held that this approach rested on errors of law and an unduly restrictive view of when it was appropriate to open an investigation. The Court did not find that forced labour had been proved, that any UK company had committed an offence or that the NCA was obliged to investigate.
In a letter to the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights dated 3 September 2026, the NCA subsequently confirmed that it had reconsidered both a Part 7 investigation and a Part 5 civil recovery investigation, but concluded that neither had a realistic prospect of success. Civil recovery would require evidence linking specific property to forced labour offences. The NCA described that task as “highly challenging” because of the “enduring opacity of supply chains” and legitimate manufacturing in the relevant region.
The political pressure has nevertheless continued. On 24 July 2025, the Joint Committee on Human Rights published its Sixth Report of Session 2024–25, Forced Labour in the UK’s Supply Chains, which found, among other things, that POCA powers “are being underused”. In a House of Lords debate on 4 September 2026, led by Lord Alton of Liverpool, the Minister of State at the Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade, Lord Sarwar, said that the Government was “working with our Home Office colleagues on what more we can do to use the Proceeds of Crime Act”.
Parliamentary and public pressure focused on a sector or supply chain could increase the likelihood of intervention. In any event, mandatory supply chain disclosures and information-sharing frameworks are expected to reduce the evidential difficulties encountered by the NCA over time.
The three cases discussed above identify new avenues of customer and product risk, potential weaknesses in transaction monitoring where payments or asset flows do not match stated sourcing, and the need for SAR escalation where intelligence creates knowledge, suspicion or reasonable grounds. They also highlight the importance of coordinated responses to account freezing orders (AFOs), property freezing orders (PFOs), disclosure orders, restraint orders and other forms of information orders.
Exposure depends not only on what a customer does, but also on where its money comes from. Corporate customers receiving funds from counterparties under investigation may be affected, as may lending, trade finance, commodity finance, correspondent banking and other activity touching high-risk supply chains.
Risk increases once a customer or the bank is on notice that funds may be recoverable property, although that point can be difficult to identify. Onboarding, periodic reviews and adverse-media processes will need to inform the analysis of when notice arises and how it is recorded.
A DAML remains the appropriate response to suspected money laundering, but escalation should also anticipate any resulting asset recovery action. Firms need to identify affected accounts and assets quickly, freeze accurately, operate accounts within the terms of any order and monitor applications for release of funds or for an order to be set aside.
Customer management is also difficult because affected customers may be customers whom the institution has no basis to exit or report. Communications and complaints handling must avoid prejudicing an asset recovery investigation. Reputational and conduct governance must also bridge silos between asset recovery, supply chain and financial-crime intelligence.
The AMLAR Strategy is a statement of intent backed by funding, headcount and a detailed delivery plan; it is not new law in itself. Its bargain with the regulated sector is explicit: less tick-box compliance in exchange for better intelligence and faster recovery.
For financial institutions, controls are no longer the endpoint of engagement with the AML system. They are increasingly the start of an intervention process that the institution does not control. The sports-sector freeze shows that innocence is no shield. The World Uyghur Congress outcome shows that the evidential bar remains real, while the strategy is funding the CPS, the NCA and forensic accountants to clear that bar more often.
Financial sector compliance has traditionally focused on the effectiveness of controls. The new strategy changes the risk profile for regulated entities because interventions requiring the financial system to respond and facilitate recovery are likely to become more common, even where they are difficult to predict. Conceptually, the strategy requires a change in mindset.