UK Government consults on reverting to criminal standard of proof for unlawful killing conclusions in inquests

(9 min read)

On 14 September 2026, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) launched a consultation on whether the inquest conclusion of unlawful killing should revert from the civil standard of proof (balance of probabilities) to the criminal standard (beyond reasonable doubt); reversing the effect of the Supreme Court's 2020 decision in Maughan. The question matters on both sides of the courtroom: for bereaved families and other interested persons, a higher threshold may make an unlawful killing conclusion harder to secure; for organisations and individuals whose conduct is under scrutiny, it would raise the bar for one of the most serious public findings an inquest can make. Healthcare, custody, workplace and transport settings are all in scope, not only policing. The consultation closes at 11:59pm on 7 December 2026.

How to participate: Responses can be sent via email, post or via the online form here.

If you would like to discuss a consultation response, or an inquest in which you are involved, please contact Lee Hughes or Lucy Balmforth. Our team acts for organisations and individuals across a wide range of sectors at inquests.

Read-in

The standard of proof applied to a coroner's inquest conclusion of unlawful killing is under fresh scrutiny. An inquest is a public, inquisitorial (fact-finding) hearing that answers four statutory questions: who the deceased was, and when, where and how they came by their death. Where the death engages Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to life), typically because the state may be implicated, the inquest must also examine the broader circumstances in which the death occurred.

Whilst most inquests are conducted by a coroner sitting alone, a jury is required under section 7 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 required where the coroner has reason to suspect that the death:

occurred whilst the deceased was in custody or otherwise in state detention, and was violent, unnatural or of unknown cause;
resulted from an act or omission of a police officer, or a member of a service police force, acting in the purported execution of their duty; or
was caused by a notifiable accident, poisoning or disease.

A coroner may also summon a jury in any other case where there is sufficient reason to do so, and cases in which unlawful killing is a realistic possibility are likely to be heard with a jury. In a jury inquest, the coroner controls the process and rules on law, evidence and which conclusions are left to the jury; the jury makes the findings of fact and returns the conclusion, including whether unlawful killing is made out.

At the end of an inquest, the coroner or jury records a conclusion. This may be a “short-form” conclusion (for example, natural causes, accident, suicide, lawful killing or unlawful killing), a narrative conclusion describing the circumstances of the death in more detail, or a combination of the two. A short-form conclusion of unlawful killing is available where the evidence shows that the death resulted from murder, manslaughter (including gross negligence manslaughter and corporate manslaughter) or infanticide. Importantly, it is not a finding of criminal liability but is nonetheless a grave public finding that a criminal homicide occurred, and it can increase pressure for a criminal investigation, regulatory action, disciplinary proceedings or civil claims.

Since Maughan, all inquest conclusions, short-form and narrative, have been determined on the civil standard. The MoJ now asks whether the short-form conclusion of unlawful killing alone should revert to the criminal standard.

The threshold matters, but for different reasons depending on who an Interested Party to an inquest is.

For bereaved families, an unlawful killing conclusion can be an authoritative public acknowledgement that a death was caused by criminal conduct, particularly where no prosecution has been brought or a prosecution has ended in acquittal.
For organisations and individuals whose conduct is examined, including employers, healthcare and care providers, public bodies, police officers and other front-line staff, the same conclusion can have serious reputational, regulatory, employment and insurance consequences, and may be relied on by others in later proceedings even though it does not determine liability.

A higher threshold would reduce exposure for those under scrutiny, but it could also leave families without the answer they seek where the evidence points strongly, but not conclusively, to a criminal cause of death. Both groups therefore have good reason to engage with the consultation.

From criminal to civil standard: the Maughan judgment

Until 2020, the short-form conclusions of suicide and unlawful killing were the only conclusions requiring proof to the criminal standard, reflecting their gravity and, in the case of unlawful killing, its historic link with criminal liability.

That changed in November 2020, when the Supreme Court in R (on the application of Maughan) v Her Majesty's Senior Coroner for Oxfordshire [2020] UKSC 46 held by a majority of three to two that the civil standard of proof applies to all inquest conclusions, short-form or narrative, including suicide and unlawful killing.

The majority of the Supreme Court considered the criminal standard inconsistent with the civil standard applied in other non-criminal proceedings, and reasoned that by applying the civil standard:

removed the illogicality of applying different standards to short-form and narrative conclusions, given that both serve the same fact-finding purpose (so that, before Maughan, a jury could not return “unlawful killing” in short form unless sure, yet could record a narrative describing the same facts on the balance of probabilities);
did not create criminal liability, or increase the risk of prosecution beyond that which already exists in related civil proceedings; and
avoided the risk that public confidence would be undermined, and bereaved families left without answers, where the criminal standard prevented an unlawful killing conclusion from being reached.

The main argument against the civil standard was that an inquest could, in effect, brand someone as a criminal without a proper criminal trial process. The majority reasoned that this risk was mitigated because an inquest would ordinarily be suspended whilst related criminal proceedings are pending.

The Rapid Review: Consulting on a return to the criminal standard

The Rapid Review was commissioned in October 2024, following the acquittal of a Metropolitan Police Sargeant on the charge of murder, after an individual was shot by police in London in September 2022. However, the Review was not confined to that case: it examined two issues, namely the test for use of force in police misconduct proceedings and the threshold for a short-form conclusion of unlawful killing, against concerns about an “uneven playing field” between the criminal, misconduct and coronial processes that may follow a state-related death.

The police use-of-force standards are being taken forward separately and is not part of this consultation. On unlawful killing, the reviewers found a strong case to return to the criminal standard but, recognising that any change would apply to every inquest and not only those involving police, recommended a full public consultation before any decision. Matters cited by the reviewers include:

the confusion caused where, for example, an officer is acquitted at trial but an inquest later concludes on the civil standard that the death was an unlawful killing;
concerns about the impact of repeated scrutiny under different standards on confidence, morale and recruitment in high-risk roles such as firearms policing; and
the seriousness of an unlawful killing conclusion.

Importantly, the reviewers concluded that changing the standard for the short-form conclusion would not affect a coroner's ability to make detailed findings in a narrative conclusion or to issue a Prevention of Future Deaths report.

Potential impact on scrutiny of deaths and relevant stakeholders

Although the Rapid Review was prompted by concerns about police accountability, the consultation paper itself emphasises that any change would apply to every inquest in which unlawful killing might be considered. Beyond policing, prisons and other places of detention, the potential reach extends to:

healthcare and social care providers;
transport operators;
high-risk industrial businesses;
construction companies;
defence and security organisations;
local authorities and other public bodies, and
education and childcare providers.

These stakeholders may become involved in inquests following deaths in which their activities, decisions, systems or statutory responsibilities are scrutinised. For organisations operating in these sectors, the significance of a return to the criminal standard would depend on the circumstances of the death and the issues under investigation.

It is here that the interests of different participants are most likely to diverge. Families and their representatives may see the civil standard as an important safeguard of the inquest's truth-finding function, particularly in deaths involving the state. Meanwhile, organisations and individuals whose conduct is examined, including front-line staff, may regard the criminal standard as a fairer reflection of the gravity of the finding.

Transport, construction and high-risk industrial businesses

Healthcare and social care providers

Wider impact

The implications extend beyond the immediate question of whether an unlawful killing conclusion is returned. A central function of the coronial process is to establish how a person came by their death and, in Article 2 inquests, in what circumstances, to provide answers to bereaved families and to identify circumstances in which further deaths might be prevented. A change in the standard of proof would not, in itself, prevent coroners from investigating organisational or systemic failures, making relevant factual findings or issuing a Prevention of Future Deaths report. Nevertheless, it could affect the formal conclusion available in some cases and, potentially, how the findings are understood by families, regulators, employers and the wider public. All participants should therefore distinguish between the threshold for a conclusion of unlawful killing and the separate questions of whether operational failures occurred, whether legal or regulatory duties were breached, and what remedial action is required.

There are also potential implications for the evidence-gathering process and organisational openness. Inquests may require organisations to disclose and explain complex evidence concerning governance, risk assessments, staffing, training, maintenance, clinical decisions, incident reporting and the implementation of previous recommendations. A higher threshold for an unlawful killing conclusion could, in some circumstances, alter the perceived significance of evidence bearing on whether the death amounted to unlawful killing. A higher threshold could, in some circumstances, alter the perceived significance of evidence bearing on whether the death amounted to unlawful killing, and therefore how interested persons approach the investigation or prioritise lines of enquiry. That risk should not be overstated: a change in the standard of proof would not remove a coroner's powers to require evidence, existing disclosure obligations or regulatory duties, and would not justify withholding evidence relevant to the circumstances of a death. The landscape is also changing. The Public Office (Accountability) Bill, commonly referred to as the “Hillsborough Law”, would impose a statutory duty of candour and assistance on public authorities and public officials in their dealings with inquests, inquiries and investigations, backed by criminal sanctions. It is not yet law: the Bill completed its House of Lords committee stage on 21 October 2026.

The proposed change therefore warrants consideration by a broad range of participants, not only those directly involved in policing. Regardless of the outcome, organisations should continue to prioritise timely and complete disclosure, transparent engagement with coroners and bereaved families, robust internal investigations and demonstrable action on identified risks. The key question for the consultation is whether returning to the criminal standard would provide greater fairness and consistency without adversely affecting the ability of inquests to establish the circumstances of deaths, scrutinise organisational conduct and contribute to the prevention of future fatalities.

Conclusion

The consultation matters not simply because it may alter the route to one particular conclusion, but because it goes to the heart of what inquests are for: establishing the facts of a death, and in Article 2 cases its wider circumstances, identifying failings and supporting learning. For families, the question is whether a higher threshold would deny them an authoritative answer; for organisations and individuals, whether the current threshold exposes them to a grave public finding without the safeguards of a criminal trial.

The consultation is open to anyone with a professional or personal interest. Its nine questions include:

whether the standard of proof for the short-form conclusion of unlawful killing should change from the civil to the criminal standard, and why;
what impacts, positive or negative, a change would have for the sectors most likely to be involved, such as policing, healthcare, prisons and workplaces, and the advantages or disadvantages of applying different standards to short-form and narrative conclusions of unlawful killing;
how a change might affect public confidence in the inquest system and the experiences of bereaved families and communities affected by deaths involving state agencies, together with any equality impacts; and
whether the standard for lawful killing, or any other short-form conclusion, should also be reconsidered.

Responses can be submitted by one route only: the online questionnaire, email or post. The MoJ aims to publish its response within three months of the consultation closing.

Next steps

We recommend that organisations, individuals and families likely to be affected consider responding, with supporting examples or evidence where possible, before the consultation closes at 11:59pm on 7 December 2026.

Submit an online response