The High Court has recently found that time limits for the appeal of decisions of a sanction imposed by the Medical Council are absolute and incapable of extension by the Court. In Mohamed Akasha Ahmed .v. The Medical Council, [2026] IEHC 240 the Court considered whether it has jurisdiction to extend the time limit for bringing an appeal under s. 75(1) of the Medical Practitioners Act 2007 (2007 Act). The Court found that the proper interpretation of the statutory provision imposes an absolute time limit which is not capable of being extended.
The Applicant, Dr Akasha was found guilty of professional misconduct by the Medical Council’s Fitness to Practise Committee, which led to the Council deciding to cancel his registration on 11 December 2024. The Council found that the matter involved serious dishonesty and attached particular significance to the applicant’s absence of insight. The Council considered that honesty, integrity and probity were essential requirements for any doctor practising medicine and concluded that cancellation was the appropriate and proportionate sanction. The Council considered mitigating factors including Dr Akasha’s health, personal circumstances, and prior good record but ultimately determined that his lack of insight and dishonesty warranted the most serious sanction. Notice of the decision was given to Dr Akasha on 12 December 2024, advising him of a right to appeal within 21 days. The appeal period expired on 2 January 2025, but Dr Akasha only sought an extension on 12 February 2025, citing serious illness and other personal difficulties as reasons for the delay.
Section 75(1) provides that an appeal against a decision of the Medical Council may be brought to the High Court not later than 21 days after being notified of the decision. Dr Akasha argued that the court retains an inherent jurisdiction to extend time, particularly given the impact on his constitutional rights to litigate and earn a livelihood. Further, the applicant relied on his ill health and communication difficulties in support of his application.
Dr Akasha argued that section 75(1) should not be construed strictly as it restricted a litigant’s right of access to the courts. The Court, while considering the Supreme Court’s decision in Kirwan v. O'Leary and Ors [2023] IESC 27, held that, unlike in Kirwan, the wording and context of section 75(1) of the 2007 Act clearly and unambiguously precluded any power to extend time, and therefore the Court had no jurisdiction to enlarge the period, even under the Rules of the Superior Courts.. The Medical Council argued that the wording of s. 75(1), read in the context of the wider statutory scheme, demonstrated a clear legislative intention that the time limit be absolute.
The Court considered section 75 in the context of the broader statutory scheme, particularly sections 74 and 76 of the 2007 Act.
Section 74(2)(b) links the coming into effect of certain sanctions directly to the expiry of the 21-day appeal period while section 76(1) requires the Medical Council to bring a confirmation application as soon as is practicable after the expiration of the appeal period where no appeal has been brought within the period allowed under section 75(1). The Court accepted the Medical Council’s submission that these provisions were difficult to reconcile with an implied jurisdiction to extend time. The statutory scheme contemplated two mutually exclusive procedural routes: either an appeal under section 75 or a confirmation application under section 76.
A significant aspect of the reasoning concerned the interaction between sections 74, 75 and 76 of the 2007 Act. The Court considered that the linkage between the expiry of the appeal period and the commencement of the confirmation procedure strongly supported the conclusion that the time limit was intended to be fixed and definitive. The Court also attached significance to the wording “may, not later than 21 days.” The Court held that the phrase “not later than” constituted negative language indicating that an appeal could not be brought outside the specified period. The Court reviewed the Supreme Court’s guidance in Heather Hill Management Company CLG .v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 43, emphasising that statutory provisions must be interpreted by reference to their text, context and purpose, while also recognising that “the words of a statute are the first port of call in its interpretation.” The Court accepted that, following Kirwan, statutory provisions restricting a person’s right to litigate must be construed strictly. The Court found that the wording used in section 75(1) was materially different from the wording considered in Kirwan.
The Court also considered the judgment in Property Services Regulatory Authority .v. Dooley [2024] IECA 251. The Court concluded that the same key features identified in Dooley were present in the 2007 Act: statutory language indicating that an appeal cannot be brought after a specified period, and a linked confirmation mechanism triggered by expiry of the appeal period.
Ultimately, the Court held that the language of section 75(1), viewed in its statutory context, “clearly and unambiguously precludes” any power to extend time. The court further held that section 75(1) ousted any assumed inherent jurisdiction, including under the Rules of the Superior Courts, to extend time for bringing an appeal. The Court emphasised that where primary legislation prescribes an absolute time limit, rules of court cannot override the statutory scheme by permitting an extension of time.
