# WHAT NEEDS PROTECTING ON A P2P DEAL?

### IN OUR SURVEY OF THE DEAL LANDSCAPE FOR PRIVATE EQUITY BACKED PUBLIC-TO-PRIVATE TAKEOVERS (P2Ps), INTERLOPER RISK WAS A KEY DETERRENT FOR 44% OF RESPONDENTS.

While only 10% of P2Ps in the last three years have had public interlopers, deal protection concerns bite earlier in the P2P process – a leak announcement can put a Target "in play" and crater a deal.

The Takeover Code prohibits exclusivity arrangements and break fees – but here are five practical ways to make delivery of a P2P more certain.

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# NIMBLY NAVIGATING THE ANNOUNCEMENT REGIME

- Active consideration: Takeover Code regulation begins when consideration of a deal passes from the merely routine to where more serious effort is being devoted to it – e.g. Investment Committee approval in principle or engagement with financial advisers.
- Announcement and PUSU Regime: following active consideration, any untoward price movement or press speculation may require public naming of offeror and start the 28 day "put-upor-shut-up" clock (PUSU) by when a firm offer must be launched.
- Not as draconian as it sounds: the Panel grants dispensations liberally and a tight deal team mitigates leak risk. If commercial terms are agreed, the PUSU deadline will always be extended if the Target consents.

#### **PREPARATION AND SPEED**

- **Prepare early:** scope the takeover process in advance: 55% of respondents to our survey identified "deal complexity" as a concern and 66% had no recent P2P experience.
- **Speed minimises leak risk:** carry out due diligence on public information as part of the initial deal evaluation and settle deal strategy early to minimise leak exposure.
- The Rule of Six: an offeror may only speak to a maximum of six parties outside its advisory team prior to an announcement. This includes debt funders and significant shareholders – use these slots wisely.





#### IRREVOCABLE UNDERTAKING STRATEGY

- Target cannot commit to an offer: the Code prohibits imposing any contractual obligations on a Target, save in very limited circumstances – no exclusivity, break fee or conduct restrictions possible.
- Shareholders can commit to an offer: obtain 'hard' irrevocables from management to accept the offer which cannot fall away, and 'soft' irrevocables from key shareholders which only fall away if a competing bid clears an agreed hurdle price – and provide a right to match.
- **Timing of irrevocables:** these commitments can only be obtained shortly before launch of a firm offer so don't act as early stage deal protection.

#### STAKEBUILDING

- **Blocking stake:** obtaining a significant stake in the Target could deter interlopers, and lower the average price paid for the Target's shares.
- **Price setting rules:** stakebuilding in advance is disclosable and can set a floor for future offer price be cautious in falling markets.
- Limited use for scheme of arrangement: schemes are the default option for implementation of a bid; any stake acquired will not count towards the 75% approval threshold for approval of a takeover by way of scheme.

#### **MANAGEMENT TERMS**

- Impact on due diligence: all due diligence materials received must be shared with competing bidders; backing a strong management team can reduce the need for diligence and minimise exposure to competitor-interlopers on DD 'fishing expeditions'.
- Timing of management's deal: if management's equity roll over deal is even partly-negotiated it will require disclosure and approval by 50+% of independent shareholders either conclude in advance or leave until post completion. No halfway houses.
- **Speed of implementation:** increasingly management deals are being delayed until postcompletion to aid speed of implementation – how to provide comfort in practice to management is key.