New fraud offences in the Fraud Act 2006

The Fraud Act 2006 came into force 15 January 2007. It has radically changed the law of criminal fraud.

The old law

Before the Fraud Act came into force, the statutory fraud offences were based on deception. They included:

• Obtaining property by deception.
  
  
• Obtaining a money transfer by deception.
  
  
• Obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception.
  
  
• Obtaining services by deception.

Each offence would only apply in specific circumstances.

In addition there was (and remains) a non statutory offence of conspiracy to defraud which is defined very widely.  There is no need to intend deception or financial loss but there must be more than one participant in the fraud.

Defects in the old law

The deception offences had become a bit of a mess. It was often confusing to work out which offence applied, and they frequently overlapped.

The excessive intricacy of the deception offences contributed to the length and complexity of trials. Moreover, the whole area was riddled with technical loopholes. For example, the court held that a machine (for example a cashpoint) cannot be “deceived” because it does not think.

The new law

The Fraud Act swept all of the old statutory deception offences away. Instead a new offence of fraud has been defined as follows:

• The defendant must have been dishonest, and have intended to make a gain or to cause a loss to another.
  
  
• In addition, the defendant must carry out one of these acts:

Making a false or misleading representation.

Failing to disclose to another person information which he is under a legal duty to disclose. 
 
Abusing a position of trust.

The new offence of fraud is intended to be wide and also flexible, particularly as technology changes.

There is no reliance on the concept of "deception". It does not matter whether the false information actually deceives anyone, it is the misleading intention which counts.

The offence of conspiracy to defraud has not been abolished, but the government's objective is that reliance on it by prosecutors should be very much less.

The impact of the change

What will the impact on business of the new act? This will probably not be very profound outside the criminal law enforcement field, but several areas should be highlighted:

• The Fraud Act could be used to criminalise conduct which may previously only have amounted to a breach of contract or other civil law or moral obligation. Examples may include:

Breach of banking covenants. Where a loan contract contains an obligation by the borrower to draw an event of termination to the attention of the bank, then a failure to do so may now be a fraud.

"Shill bidding" on online auction sites. This is where sellers bid up the price of their own items using a second identity.

Certain advertising practices previously seen as sharp, but not illegal, for example paying for a favourable restaurant or hotel review in a publication which appears at first glance to be independent.

Breach of fiduciary duty by directors; and preferences and transactions at undervalue in insolvency situations.

• The Fraud Act significantly limits the right of defendant to claim privilege against self-incrimination (the right to refuse to disclose documents or give evidence if doing so would expose him to the risk of a criminal prosecution) where he is being charged with a fraud offence.
  
  
• Finally, there is the money laundering legislation. As a result of the wider offence, the situations where parties may be obliged by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to report suspicious transactions to the authorities have been increased.

Roger Laville

Non-party costs orders

Orders for payment of costs by a non-party (under s51 of the Supreme Court Act 1981) used to be regarded as very exceptional and the courts were wary of making them. Recently the courts have shown a greater willingness to order a non-party to pay costs, generating a large number of reported cases.

These cases show that:

• although costs orders against non-parties are "exceptional", "exceptional in this context means no more than outside the ordinary run of cases where parties litigate for their own benefit and at their own expense" (Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd [2004] 1 WLR 2807 (PC) at 25 and Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd (Nos. 2&3) [2005] 1 WLR 3055 (supra)).
  
  
• the jurisdiction will not usually be exercised against "pure funders" (Dymocks at 25 and Arkin (supra)). Pure funders are "those with no personal interest in the litigation, who do not stand to benefit from it, are not funding it as a matter of business and in no way seek to control its course" (Hamilton v Al Fayed (No.2) [2003] QB 1175 at 40).
  
  
• "Where the non-party not merely funds the proceedings but substantially also controls or at any rate is to benefit from them" they will usually be ordered to pay the costs if unsuccessful, as they are the "real party" to the litigation. (Dymocks at 25 and Arkin (supra)).
  
  
• it would be exceptional for a costs order to be made against a non-party where the applicant had a cause of action against that non-party and could have joined them as a party to the original proceedings (Symphony Group v Hodgson [1994] QB 179 at 193A).
  
  
• while any impropriety or the pursuit of speculative litigation may of itself support the making of an order against a non-party, its absence does not preclude the making of an order (Dymocks at 33).

However, these considerations should not be treated as a check list of factors which must always be present before a costs order will be made against a non-party, as each case will be decided on its facts (Secretary of State v Aurum Marketing Ltd [2000] All ER 1009).

Types of party against whom costs orders can be made

Insurers

The recent case of Plymouth & South West Co-operative Society Ltd v Architecture, Structure & Management Ltd [2006] EWHC 3252 (TCC) involved an application for a non-party costs order against the professional indemnity insurer of an insolvent firm of architects. The court followed established case law which provides that a non-party order will usually be made in the case where a liability insurer (1) determines that the claim would be fought, (2) funds its defence, (3) has conduct of the litigation, (4) defends it exclusively to protect its own interest and (5) the defence fails in its entirety.

Company directors, shareholders, liquidators, receivers and creditors

This category has been described as “perhaps the most difficult" (Dymocks at 25). Relevant considerations are as follows:

• Where a non-party promotes and funds proceedings by an insolvent company solely or substantially for their own financial benefit, they should generally be liable for the costs if their claim, defence or appeal fails (Dymocks at 29). This may be so even if the non-party acts in good faith and without any impropriety (Goodwood Recoveries v Breen [2006] 2 All ER 533).
  
  
• A non-party order will not inevitably be made where the non-party is himself a director or liquidator who can realistically be said to be acting in the interests of the company rather than in his own interests (Dymocks at 29).
  
  
• Even where a person is a major shareholder and dominant director in a company which brings proceedings,
  that of itself will not justify a non-party order. Something additional, such as a fresh injection of capital to fund the litigation, is normally required (Dymocks at 26).

Witnesses

It has previously been thought that witnesses would be protected against a non-party costs order by the doctrine of witness immunity, however in rare circumstances this may not be the case. The case of Phillips v Symes [2004] EWHC 2330 held that witness immunity did not protect an expert witness whose evidence was said to have been grossly negligent.

"Pure funders" and family/friends

Non-party costs orders will not generally be granted against pure funders and disinterested relatives. “I do not consider that an order under section 51 will normally be appropriate where a disinterested relative has, out of natural affection, funded costs of a claim or a defence that is reasonably advanced” (Phillips LJ in Murphy v Young & Co's Brewery [1997] 1 All ER 518 at 1604H, following the Court of Appeal decision in Cooper v Maxwell (unreported), Court of Appeal 1992). The position would of course be different if the relative has a personal stake in the outcome.

Practical pointers for those thinking of making a non-party application on funding grounds

• Consider, first of all, whether there are grounds for an application for security for costs (see CPR 25). If such an application is likely to succeed against the claimant then it should be made: failure to seek security where there have been obvious grounds to do so will be taken into account by the court in the exercise of the highly discretionary jurisdiction under section 51.
  
  
• In practical terms one of the greatest barriers to a non-party order is the difficulty of establising that litigation is being funded by a non-party and, if so, by whom. If you are unsure then you should ask your opponent directly how the litigation is being funded. If he refuses to tell you, an application can be made for an order for disclosure by him and his solicitors when the proceedings have concluded.
  
  
• Once you have good grounds to believe that a non party is funding the litigation, tell that party that you reserve the right to seek an order for costs against them if you win.
  
  
• The non-party must be added as a party to the proceedings for the purpose of costs only and  must be given a reasonable opportunity to attend a hearing at which the court will consider the matter. The application should normally be made to the trial judge. The application should be served on the respondent and the other parties with the supporting evidence. When serving the other parties it is prudent to inform them that no liability is accepted for any costs incurred by them, as opposed to the respondent to the application: this should encourage them either not to participate in the application at all or to work together with the respondent.

Anthony Taylor and Jenny Harrison

"Defect" under the Consumer Protection Act - Court of Appeal ruling

Despite the fact that Consumer Protection Act 1987 (CPA) has been on the statute books for almost a decade, there have been very few reported cases giving guidance as to the standard of care required from manufacturers, own branders and retailers. The aim of the legislation was to make it quicker and easier for consumers to bring proceedings for injuries and damage caused by defective products. In the recent case of Tesco Stores Ltd v Pollard (a minor)¹ the Court of Appeal reviewed the concept of a "defect" under the CPA and gave some interesting guidance on the inter-relationship between voluntary standards (e.g. British Standards) and the CPA.

Tesco v Pollard

The claim was for damages for injuries caused to a 13 month old child who had opened and consumed part of the contents of a bottle of Tesco own brand dishwasher powder which was sold in a screw-top bottle with a child resistant cap.

The claimant alleged that the detachability of the cap evidenced a defect in the bottle's design. This was accepted by the trial judge, who decided that the child resistant cap design had featured in the marketing for the product and having decided to fit a child resistant cap, a consumer was entitled to expect the cap to function at least up to the standard usually applied to child resistant caps (i.e. the relevant British Standard) even though a consumer would not be aware of the actual standard. There was a legitimate public expectation that the design would conform to the British Standard, when in fact it did not. The Judge found that the design was therefore defective and that Tesco was liable both in negligence and for breach of the CPA.

Tesco successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal. As regards the CPA the Court of Appeal focused on whether there had been a breach of Section 3(1) CPA under which liability for damage caused by a defective product is triggered when "the safety of the product is not such as persons are generally entitled to expect" and held that the public were simply entitled to expect that the bottle would be more difficult to open than an ordinary screw top bottle. The Court of Appeal was not prepared to re-write the CPA to create a warranty in favour of consumers that any product would need to comply with voluntary safety standards.

The Court of Appeal rejected any argument that the product was defective because it did not comply with the British Standard torque measure. There was no reference to the British Standard on the bottle and so the Court determined that there was no reason to suppose members of the public would even be aware of the Standard's existence. As the child resistant cap was more difficult to open than an ordinary cap the product was not defective, notwithstanding the fact it did not meet the applicable British Standard.

Comment

The case offers some comfort to manufacturers/own branders regarding compliance with voluntary product safety standards. The fact that the cap still had some level of 'child resistance' meant that it was not defective under the Act. Violation of a voluntary product standard will not automatically lead to a conclusion that a product is defective.

The pro-consumer policy underpinning the legislation was not evident in this decision. It will be interesting to see how the Court of Appeal's reasoning influences the future approach to what is, and is not, a defective product for the purposes of the CPA.

Moya Clifford and Rebecca Moore

Addleshaw Goddard's Product Liability Team
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¹ [2006] EWCA Civ 393

Sale of goods: added protection on refunds for consumers of the ether

Contracts for the sale of goods are governed by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended).  The Act gives special rights to consumers for their protection.  For example, it provides that, where a consumer is entitled to a refund, a refund should be given in a "reasonable time".  What is a reasonable time depends on the facts of the particular contract.  For example, it may be reasonable for a customer to wait a week for a replacement jumper, but it may be unreasonable to make a customer wait two days for a replacement suitcase if that customer is going on holiday the following day.

Consumers who purchase goods over the internet (or by fax, email or telephone) have even greater protection through the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 (Regulations).

Automatic refund 

Under the Regulations, if the customer cancels the contract, the seller must reimburse him any sum paid free of charge as soon as possible and, in any event, no later than 30 days from the date of cancellation (not collection).  For cancellation of the contract by the customer to be valid it must be in writing (or other durable medium) within 7 working days from the day after the customer receives the goods.  Notice of cancellation is properly given if left at the retailer's place of business, by post, by fax or by email.  'Durable medium' is not defined by the Regulations but OFT guidelines describe it as a form in which information can be retained and reproduced but not edited, such as an email, letter or fax.  A phone call is not enough unless it states in the retailer's terms and conditions that it is acceptable.  The customer may, at the retailer's discretion, be charged the direct cost of returning the goods, but the retailer must tell the customer about this in the written information they give to them. 

Exceptions

There are certain exceptions to the Regulations, which include delivery of groceries, contracts for the supply of financial services or for accommodation, transport, catering or leisure. 

Right to change your mind

Under the Act, a customer is not entitled as of right to return goods simply because he has changed his mind (although this is commonly offered on a discretionary basis by many retailers).  However, under the Regulations, a customer can change his mind as of right.  This is over and above the rights under the Act.

Enforcement

If the 30 day limit for the refund is exceeded, a customer may complain to the OFT local authority trading standard department.  The OFT can then apply to the court for an injunction to ensure compliance with the Regulations, which might be to give the refund. The first point before involving the OFT would be for the consumer to write to the retailer in breach, tell them they are in breach and to threaten a complaint to the OFT should the refund the retailer refuse to give the refund.  If a complaint is made to the OFT, it may release details of the breach to the public with obvious unwelcome oublicity for the retailer and its business! 

The OFT guidelines can be found at http://www.oft.gov.uk/advice_and_resources/resource_base/legal/distance-selling-regulations.  The guidelines also provide specific guidance on auction sites over the internet.

If you have any queries about the Regulations or sale of goods legislation generally, please contact Kathryn Bailey on 0113 209 2260. 

Producing and placing brokers' duties - "Whose duty is it anyway"?

When examining producing and placing brokers' duties you should start by looking at the contractual relationships. Here we concentrate on the duties owed by brokers and the parties to whom they are owed.

Producing brokers and insureds

Contractual duties owed to the Insured include: placement of insurance coverage within a reasonable time, exercising reasonable skill and care, advising the insured of any deficiencies in cover, accounting to the insured, and holding all insurance monies in specially designated accounts. Additionally, fiduciary duties are owed by all agents, including brokers, which for example prevent brokers from accepting secret commissions. The producing broker also owes duties to the insured in tort, principally in negligence.

The broker's duty of care exists prior to, during and post placement of risks. Post placement duties were recently focussed upon in HIH -v- JLT Risk Solutions Limited (2006),  a film finance insurance claim. 

The insurer, HIH, claimed that its broker was negligent when reinsurers refused to indemnify HIH for claims paid to its original insured. HIH alleged the broker breached its duty in failing properly to alert HIH to the significance of the reduction in the number of films being made, which constituted a material change in the risk. 

The Judge held that the broker had breached his duty of care, as he should have read relevant Risk Management reports carefully (although they were apparently also circulated to HIH and reinsurers), and if any of the information were a matter of potential concern, the broker should have alerted HIH.  HIH's claim failed, however, on causation.

Needless to say, the Court of Appeal decision (awaited) will have significant ramifications for brokers. JLT's appeal shows the concern in the broking community about the expansion of duties owed by brokers, particularly post placement of risks.

Producing and placing brokers

Placing brokers are used when the broker initially instructed (the producing broker) to place the risk enlists the help of another broker (a "sub-broker" or "placing broker") to carry out that task.  Often, producing brokers are based overseas, and they rely on placing brokers in the market in which they wish to obtain cover (e.g. London) to place the risk.  Producing brokers also use placing brokers if they do not possess the expertise to place specialist risks.

Problems arising between these brokers generally concern payment and/or receipt of commission and/or premiums.  In Heath Lambert Limited -v- Sociedad de Corretaje de Seguros ("SCORT") (2003) a Venezuelan marine insurer, instructed SCORT as producing broker to obtain reinsurance in the London market.  SCORT instructed Heath Lambert as placing broker to place the reinsurance.  Reinsurers extended cover after placement, and the additional premiums due were, as is usual in the marine market, paid to reinsurers by Heath.  Neither SCORT nor the insurer reimbursed Heath, so Heath sued both for reimbursement.  The decision reported was the application by both defendants to set aside the order granted to Heath giving permission to serve the claim out of the jurisdiction.  SCORT argued it was the insurer's liability to pay premiums to Heath, and the insurer contended it was SCORT's responsibility.

The Judge said that when a producing broker employed a placing broker, the general rule was that there was privity of contract between the two brokers, and no privity between the insured and the placing broker.  However, based on witness evidence that SCORT were "intermediaries" and not "brokers" the Judge thought there might be privity between the insured and the placing broker.  The starting point therefore remains that a contract will usually only exist between the placing and producing broker. 

Producing brokers and placing brokers – liability in tort

A producing broker can be held personally and vicariously liable for the actions/omissions of its placing broker.  Examples may include where the producing broker does not clearly state what is needed for the cover, or where he chooses an inadequate placing broker.  The producing broker should carefully monitor the placing broker's activities and check any insurance proposals submitted by the placing broker.  There are few authorities on vicarious liability issues.  In Youell -v- Bland Welch & Co Limited (No. 2) (1990) it was assumed the producing and placing broker were equally responsible for negligent placing of reinsurance.  Phillips J said it was an established principle of English law that a broker is liable to its principal for the performance of its own duties which have been delegated to a sub-broker.  However, this area is far from clear cut and in situations where both brokers are involved, both could be held equally responsible.

Duties owed to producing brokers by placing brokers were addressed in the recent Court of Appeal decision of Daryl Fisk v Brian Thornhill & Son (a firm)[2007] EWCA Civ 152 which concerned negligence of both the producing and placing brokers. The appeal resulted in the producing broker obtaining from the placing broker a 25% contribution (pursuant to the Civil Liability (Contribution Act) 1978) of the amount, including costs, that the producing broker had paid to the insured.

Placing brokers and insureds

There is no privity of contract here.  In Prentis Donegan –v- Leeds & Leeds (1998) the defendant producing broker argued that there was privity between the placing broker and insured so that the placing broker had a cause of action against the insured for reimbursement of premium which the placing broker paid in advance to insurers. 

The court held the placing broker had no cause of action against the insured as there was no privity of contract. There was nothing to show complete substitution of the producing broker by the placing broker and no intention to create a direct contractual relationship between the placing broker and the insured.  

In line with general principles of tort law, which must find some form of special relationship between parties if any duty is to exist, the House of Lords held in Henderson -v- Merrett Syndicates Limited (1994) that in some situations the relationship between the principal and the sub-agent was so close to be akin to a contract, even though there was no contract between them.  In a situation where the risk is placed by a placing broker, a duty in tort can only exist if there is a "voluntary assumption" of responsibility by the placing broker.  For the purposes of establishing a claim against the broker, the insured would also have to prove that the actions of the placing broker caused the loss. 

A 2006 decision, BP Plc –v- Aon Limited sheds light on the "assumption of responsibility" issue.  Proceedings were brought by BP regarding a global construction all risk-open cover agreement.  The insurance was to cover physical loss and damage to the property of BP, its affiliates and co-venturers.  For a contract of insurance to be created under the open cover, a declaration in respect of the particular project had to be made to each of the underwriters involved.  The open cover was initially negotiated with Aon Texas.  A service agreement setting out terms upon which Aon Texas was to act for the placement, administration, operation and claims recovery was agreed.  BP asked Aon London, a company affiliated with the Aon Group, to make declarations to relevant underwriters.  Aon London declared the projects to leading underwriters only, believing this would automatically bind the following market.  BP was unable to recover the full value of claims for projects not properly declared to all underwriters. 

The judge noted that Aon London had a close relationship with BP involving repeated direct contact, performing a crucial function in effecting valid cover for the off shore projects. Moreover, the  existence of a service agreement, between BP and Aon Texas, did not displace the duty by Aon London arising from their undertaking of responsibility. Aon London were liable, in tort, for breach of duty.  Despite there being no privity, the placing broker may therefore still be liable to an insured on grounds of a voluntary "assumption of responsibility".

Placing brokers and insurers

In the context of marine reinsurance, a liability is imposed on placing brokers under Section 53 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906: "unless otherwise agreed, where a marine policy is effected on behalf of the insured by a broker, the broker is directly responsible to the insurer for the premiums".  This issue was covered in the Heath Lambert case (see above) where the placing broker was responsible to underwriters for payment of premiums.  It is questionable whether this marine practice extends to placing brokers generally. There are few reported cases. It seems that this practice is not yet well enough established outside the marine market to be recognised by the courts.  Therefore, other than in the marine market, it is unlikely that a placing broker will be liable to pay premium to insurers.

Conclusion

Brokers' duties are developing and expanding. In the current climate, brokers should take care in their dealings with all parties: even whether there is no privity of contract, the courts can and will find ways to hold negligent brokers responsible.

Sonia Campbell

Key recent developments affecting dispute resolution

Anti suit injunctions to support arbitration clauses to be reviewed by the European Court of Justice

The Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Article 1 (2) (d) very clearly excludes arbitration proceedings from its scope.  For this reason English courts have continued to grant anti suit injunctions to prevent parties from issuing court proceedings in other member states in breach of arbitration agreements (despite ECJ rulings that they should not grant them to support, for example, jurisdiction agreements).  An anti suit injunctions was granted in West Tankers Inc v RAI Riunione Adriatica di Sciurta SPA & Ors to support an arbitration agreement.  But, following an appeal to the House of Lords by the injuncted party, the House referred to the ECJ the question whether it is consistent with the Regulation for a court of a member state to restrain a person from commencing or continuing proceedings in another EU member state on the ground that such proceedings are in breach of an arbitration agreement.  The House of Lords' own view was that courts should be able to support the arbitral process by restraining proceedings brought elsewhere where there is a clear agreement to arbitrate.

The ECJ may not agree.  It may rule that the courts of the member state court first seised of the dispute should decide on their own jurisdiction without interference from the courts of another member state.  Commentators note that if it does so rule that will limit the autonomy of those who choose to arbitrate, thereby reducing the appeal of the EU as a venue for international arbitration, possibly damaging  economic interests, particularly in the leading arbitration centres such as Paris, London and Stockholm.

West Tankers Inc v RAI Riunione Adriatica di Sciurta SPA & Ors, House of Lords, 21 February 2007

Changing experts – the price may be disclosure of an earlier report

The Court of Appeal, several years ago, held that once an expert had been identified in case management directions, if a party were to ask for permission to rely on the report of a different expert the earlier report should be disclosed (Beck v MOD, 2003, EWCA, Civ 1043).  That approach has since been confirmed in a decision which reasoned that it was not the court itself ordering that privilege be overriden in the earlier report.  Rather the party choosing to instruct a new expert could do so only on condition that it waive privilege in the earlier report.  This January the court had to look at whether there was any distinction between the previous Court of Appeal decision and where a report from an unidentified expert was obtained before an action was started.  In this case the claimant had been injured by a firework manufactured by the defendant and an expert had produced a report for the claimant pre action.  After proceeedings started a different expert was instructed by the claimant.  The judge held that he should follow the Court of Appeal decision mentioned above: where permission to rely on an expert is sought any earlier report by another expert in the same discipline should be disclosed.  The judge commented that this was particularly important where tests had been carried out by the earlier expert on an exhibit.

Solicitors have frequently used expert advisers, whom they do not actually ask to draft reports, to provide privileged advice, before instructing an expert formally under Part 35 of the Civil Procedure Rules.  That practice may now be vulnerable, where, because of site visits or tests on exhibits, the other party or the court may learn of the advising expert's assistance and identity.  Parties will also avoid naming experts in case management directions, so that further permission will not be needed if the identity of the expert to be used changes.

Carruthers v MP Fireworks Limited and Another, Bristol County Court, 26 January 2007

Nearing the end of a limitation period?  You should formulate your claim properly, not just issue and leave it.

The court has an inherent power, in Rule 3.4 (2) (b) of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), to strike out claims as an abuse of process.  It did so in Nomura v Granada, where Nomura issued a Claim Form  without being able to formulate on the claim form, as required by Rule 16.2 of the CPR, a concise statement of the nature of the claim.  Granada refused to enter a standstill agreement and the claim form was formally served.

Granada applied to strike out the claim form on the grounds that Nomura had no intention of prosecuting the claim and had not communicated the basis of the claim. The claim was struck out, the judge holding that, at the time of issue, the claimant should properly "identify the essence of the claim" and, given appropriate time, should be able to "marshall what it knew to formulate Particulars of Claim".

Whilst immediate service of detailed particulars of the claim is not required, it is not enough simply to issue the claim form in very general terms. Parties must be able to comply with CPR 16.2 and cannot afford to sit on their hands, or, in the words of the judge, " hope that something may turn up".

Nomura International PLC v Granada Group Limited and Ors, Commercial Court, 23 March 2007

Service of claim form by post effective even where defendant is out of jurisdiction at time of service

The Court of Appeal recently approved service at a defendant's business address at a time when he was actually abroad. It did so on the grounds that, as service by post has been permitted for many years as an alternative to personal service, it makes no sense to determine whether or not such service is effective by reference to whether a defendant is within the jurisdiction at the deemed date of service.

This is a very useful decision, removing some of the uncertainty from commonly used methods of service – by post at a claimant's last known address within the jurisdiction and at his or her place of business within the jurisdiction.

Kamali v City & Country Properties Limited [2006] EWCA Civ 1879

Kate Menin